NEW
HAVEN – I am one of the winners of this year’s Nobel Memorial Prize in
Economic Sciences, which makes me acutely aware of criticism of the
prize by those who claim that economics – unlike chemistry, physics, or
medicine, for which Nobel Prizes are also awarded – is not a science.
Are they right?
One
problem with economics is that it is necessarily focused on policy,
rather than discovery of fundamentals. Nobody really cares much about
economic data except as a guide to policy: economic phenomena do not
have the same intrinsic fascination for us as the internal resonances of
the atom or the functioning of the vesicles and other organelles of a
living cell. We judge economics by what it can produce. As such, economics is rather more like engineering than physics, more practical than spiritual.
There
is no Nobel Prize for engineering, though there should be. True, the
chemistry prize this year looks a bit like an engineering prize, because
it was given to three researchers – Martin Karplus, Michael Levitt, and
Arieh Warshel – “for the development of multiscale models of complex chemical systems”
that underlie the computer programs that make nuclear magnetic
resonance hardware work. But the Nobel Foundation is forced to look at
much more such practical, applied material when it considers the
economics prize.
The
problem is that once we focus on economic policy, much that is not
science comes into play. Politics becomes involved, and political
posturing is amply rewarded by public attention. The Nobel Prize is
designed to reward those who do not play tricks for attention, and who,
in their sincere pursuit of the truth, might otherwise be slighted.
Why
is it called a prize in “economic sciences,” rather than just
“economics”? The other prizes are not awarded in the “chemical sciences”
or the “physical sciences.”
Fields
of endeavor that use “science” in their titles tend to be those that
get masses of people emotionally involved and in which crackpots seem to
have some purchase on public opinion. These fields have “science” in
their names to distinguish them from their disreputable cousins.
The term political science
first became popular in the late eighteenth century to distinguish it
from all the partisan tracts whose purpose was to gain votes and
influence rather than pursue the truth. Astronomical science
was a common term in the late nineteenth century, to distinguish it from
astrology and the study of ancient myths about the constellations. Hypnotic science
was also used in the nineteenth century to distinguish the scientific
study of hypnotism from witchcraft or religious transcendentalism.
There
was a need for such terms back then, because their crackpot
counterparts held much greater sway in general discourse. Scientists had
to announce themselves as scientists.
In fact, even the term chemical science
enjoyed some popularity in the nineteenth century – a time when the
field sought to distinguish itself from alchemy and the promotion of
quack nostrums. But the need to use that term to distinguish true
science from the practice of imposters was already fading by the time
the Nobel Prizes were launched in 1901.
Similarly, the terms astronomical science and hypnotic science
mostly died out as the twentieth century progressed, perhaps because
belief in the occult waned in respectable society. Yes, horoscopes still
persist in popular newspapers, but they are there only for the severely
scientifically challenged, or for entertainment; the idea that the
stars determine our fate has lost all intellectual currency. Hence there
is no longer any need for the term “astronomical science.”
Critics
of “economic sciences” sometimes refer to the development of a
“pseudoscience” of economics, arguing that it uses the trappings of
science, like dense mathematics, but only for show. For example, in his
2004 book Fooled by Randomness, Nassim Nicholas Taleb
said of economic sciences: “You can disguise charlatanism under the
weight of equations, and nobody can catch you since there is no such
thing as a controlled experiment.”
But physics is not without such critics, too. In his 2004 book The Trouble with Physics: The Rise of String Theory, The Fall of a Science, and What Comes Next,
Lee Smolin reproached the physics profession for being seduced by
beautiful and elegant theories (notably string theory) rather than those
that can be tested by experimentation. Similarly, in his 2007 book Not Even Wrong: The Failure of String Theory and the Search for Unity in Physical Law, Peter Woit accused physicists of much the same sin as mathematical economists are said to commit.
My
belief is that economics is somewhat more vulnerable than the physical
sciences to models whose validity will never be clear, because the
necessity for approximation is much stronger than in the physical
sciences, especially given that the models describe people rather than
magnetic resonances or fundamental particles. People can just change
their minds and behave completely differently. They even have neuroses
and identity problems, complex phenomena that the field of behavioral
economics is finding relevant to understanding economic outcomes.
But
all the mathematics in economics is not, as Taleb suggests,
charlatanism. Economics has an important quantitative side, which cannot
be escaped. The challenge has been to combine its mathematical insights
with the kinds of adjustments that are needed to make its models fit
the economy’s irreducibly human element.
The
advance of behavioral economics is not fundamentally in conflict with
mathematical economics, as some seem to think, though it may well be in
conflict with some currently fashionable mathematical economic models.
And, while economics presents its own methodological problems, the basic
challenges facing researchers are not fundamentally different from
those faced by researchers in other fields. As economics develops, it
will broaden its repertory of methods and sources of evidence, the
science will become stronger, and the charlatans will be exposed.
NEW
HAVEN – I am one of the winners of this year’s Nobel Memorial Prize in
Economic Sciences, which makes me acutely aware of criticism of the
prize by those who claim that economics – unlike chemistry, physics, or
medicine, for which Nobel Prizes are also awarded – is not a science.
Are they right?
CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraphOne
problem with economics is that it is necessarily focused on policy,
rather than discovery of fundamentals. Nobody really cares much about
economic data except as a guide to policy: economic phenomena do not
have the same intrinsic fascination for us as the internal resonances of
the atom or the functioning of the vesicles and other organelles of a
living cell. We judge economics by what it can produce. As such, economics is rather more like engineering than physics, more practical than spiritual.
CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraphThere
is no Nobel Prize for engineering, though there should be. True, the
chemistry prize this year looks a bit like an engineering prize, because
it was given to three researchers – Martin Karplus, Michael Levitt, and
Arieh Warshel – “for the development of multiscale models of complex chemical systems”
that underlie the computer programs that make nuclear magnetic
resonance hardware work. But the Nobel Foundation is forced to look at
much more such practical, applied material when it considers the
economics prize.
CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraphThe
problem is that once we focus on economic policy, much that is not
science comes into play. Politics becomes involved, and political
posturing is amply rewarded by public attention. The Nobel Prize is
designed to reward those who do not play tricks for attention, and who,
in their sincere pursuit of the truth, might otherwise be slighted.
CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraphWhy
is it called a prize in “economic sciences,” rather than just
“economics”? The other prizes are not awarded in the “chemical sciences”
or the “physical sciences.”
CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraphFields
of endeavor that use “science” in their titles tend to be those that
get masses of people emotionally involved and in which crackpots seem to
have some purchase on public opinion. These fields have “science” in
their names to distinguish them from their disreputable cousins.
CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraphThe term political science
first became popular in the late eighteenth century to distinguish it
from all the partisan tracts whose purpose was to gain votes and
influence rather than pursue the truth. Astronomical science
was a common term in the late nineteenth century, to distinguish it from
astrology and the study of ancient myths about the constellations. Hypnotic science
was also used in the nineteenth century to distinguish the scientific
study of hypnotism from witchcraft or religious transcendentalism.
CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraphThere
was a need for such terms back then, because their crackpot
counterparts held much greater sway in general discourse. Scientists had
to announce themselves as scientists.
CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraphIn fact, even the term chemical science
enjoyed some popularity in the nineteenth century – a time when the
field sought to distinguish itself from alchemy and the promotion of
quack nostrums. But the need to use that term to distinguish true
science from the practice of imposters was already fading by the time
the Nobel Prizes were launched in 1901.
CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraphSimilarly, the terms astronomical science and hypnotic science
mostly died out as the twentieth century progressed, perhaps because
belief in the occult waned in respectable society. Yes, horoscopes still
persist in popular newspapers, but they are there only for the severely
scientifically challenged, or for entertainment; the idea that the
stars determine our fate has lost all intellectual currency. Hence there
is no longer any need for the term “astronomical science.”
CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraphCritics
of “economic sciences” sometimes refer to the development of a
“pseudoscience” of economics, arguing that it uses the trappings of
science, like dense mathematics, but only for show. For example, in his
2004 book Fooled by Randomness, Nassim Nicholas Taleb
said of economic sciences: “You can disguise charlatanism under the
weight of equations, and nobody can catch you since there is no such
thing as a controlled experiment.”
CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraphBut physics is not without such critics, too. In his 2004 book The Trouble with Physics: The Rise of String Theory, The Fall of a Science, and What Comes Next,
Lee Smolin reproached the physics profession for being seduced by
beautiful and elegant theories (notably string theory) rather than those
that can be tested by experimentation. Similarly, in his 2007 book Not Even Wrong: The Failure of String Theory and the Search for Unity in Physical Law, Peter Woit accused physicists of much the same sin as mathematical economists are said to commit.
CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraphMy
belief is that economics is somewhat more vulnerable than the physical
sciences to models whose validity will never be clear, because the
necessity for approximation is much stronger than in the physical
sciences, especially given that the models describe people rather than
magnetic resonances or fundamental particles. People can just change
their minds and behave completely differently. They even have neuroses
and identity problems, complex phenomena that the field of behavioral
economics is finding relevant to understanding economic outcomes.
CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraphBut
all the mathematics in economics is not, as Taleb suggests,
charlatanism. Economics has an important quantitative side, which cannot
be escaped. The challenge has been to combine its mathematical insights
with the kinds of adjustments that are needed to make its models fit
the economy’s irreducibly human element.
CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraphThe
advance of behavioral economics is not fundamentally in conflict with
mathematical economics, as some seem to think, though it may well be in
conflict with some currently fashionable mathematical economic models.
And, while economics presents its own methodological problems, the basic
challenges facing researchers are not fundamentally different from
those faced by researchers in other fields. As economics develops, it
will broaden its repertory of methods and sources of evidence, the
science will become stronger, and the charlatans will be exposed.
Read more at http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/robert-j--shilleron-whether-he-is-a-scientist#LhU1x21U2rJJ3SSX.99
NEW
HAVEN – I am one of the winners of this year’s Nobel Memorial Prize in
Economic Sciences, which makes me acutely aware of criticism of the
prize by those who claim that economics – unlike chemistry, physics, or
medicine, for which Nobel Prizes are also awarded – is not a science.
Are they right?
CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraphOne
problem with economics is that it is necessarily focused on policy,
rather than discovery of fundamentals. Nobody really cares much about
economic data except as a guide to policy: economic phenomena do not
have the same intrinsic fascination for us as the internal resonances of
the atom or the functioning of the vesicles and other organelles of a
living cell. We judge economics by what it can produce. As such, economics is rather more like engineering than physics, more practical than spiritual.
CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraphThere
is no Nobel Prize for engineering, though there should be. True, the
chemistry prize this year looks a bit like an engineering prize, because
it was given to three researchers – Martin Karplus, Michael Levitt, and
Arieh Warshel – “for the development of multiscale models of complex chemical systems”
that underlie the computer programs that make nuclear magnetic
resonance hardware work. But the Nobel Foundation is forced to look at
much more such practical, applied material when it considers the
economics prize.
CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraphThe
problem is that once we focus on economic policy, much that is not
science comes into play. Politics becomes involved, and political
posturing is amply rewarded by public attention. The Nobel Prize is
designed to reward those who do not play tricks for attention, and who,
in their sincere pursuit of the truth, might otherwise be slighted.
CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraphWhy
is it called a prize in “economic sciences,” rather than just
“economics”? The other prizes are not awarded in the “chemical sciences”
or the “physical sciences.”
CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraphFields
of endeavor that use “science” in their titles tend to be those that
get masses of people emotionally involved and in which crackpots seem to
have some purchase on public opinion. These fields have “science” in
their names to distinguish them from their disreputable cousins.
CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraphThe term political science
first became popular in the late eighteenth century to distinguish it
from all the partisan tracts whose purpose was to gain votes and
influence rather than pursue the truth. Astronomical science
was a common term in the late nineteenth century, to distinguish it from
astrology and the study of ancient myths about the constellations. Hypnotic science
was also used in the nineteenth century to distinguish the scientific
study of hypnotism from witchcraft or religious transcendentalism.
CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraphThere
was a need for such terms back then, because their crackpot
counterparts held much greater sway in general discourse. Scientists had
to announce themselves as scientists.
CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraphIn fact, even the term chemical science
enjoyed some popularity in the nineteenth century – a time when the
field sought to distinguish itself from alchemy and the promotion of
quack nostrums. But the need to use that term to distinguish true
science from the practice of imposters was already fading by the time
the Nobel Prizes were launched in 1901.
CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraphSimilarly, the terms astronomical science and hypnotic science
mostly died out as the twentieth century progressed, perhaps because
belief in the occult waned in respectable society. Yes, horoscopes still
persist in popular newspapers, but they are there only for the severely
scientifically challenged, or for entertainment; the idea that the
stars determine our fate has lost all intellectual currency. Hence there
is no longer any need for the term “astronomical science.”
CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraphCritics
of “economic sciences” sometimes refer to the development of a
“pseudoscience” of economics, arguing that it uses the trappings of
science, like dense mathematics, but only for show. For example, in his
2004 book Fooled by Randomness, Nassim Nicholas Taleb
said of economic sciences: “You can disguise charlatanism under the
weight of equations, and nobody can catch you since there is no such
thing as a controlled experiment.”
CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraphBut physics is not without such critics, too. In his 2004 book The Trouble with Physics: The Rise of String Theory, The Fall of a Science, and What Comes Next,
Lee Smolin reproached the physics profession for being seduced by
beautiful and elegant theories (notably string theory) rather than those
that can be tested by experimentation. Similarly, in his 2007 book Not Even Wrong: The Failure of String Theory and the Search for Unity in Physical Law, Peter Woit accused physicists of much the same sin as mathematical economists are said to commit.
CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraphMy
belief is that economics is somewhat more vulnerable than the physical
sciences to models whose validity will never be clear, because the
necessity for approximation is much stronger than in the physical
sciences, especially given that the models describe people rather than
magnetic resonances or fundamental particles. People can just change
their minds and behave completely differently. They even have neuroses
and identity problems, complex phenomena that the field of behavioral
economics is finding relevant to understanding economic outcomes.
CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraphBut
all the mathematics in economics is not, as Taleb suggests,
charlatanism. Economics has an important quantitative side, which cannot
be escaped. The challenge has been to combine its mathematical insights
with the kinds of adjustments that are needed to make its models fit
the economy’s irreducibly human element.
CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraphThe
advance of behavioral economics is not fundamentally in conflict with
mathematical economics, as some seem to think, though it may well be in
conflict with some currently fashionable mathematical economic models.
And, while economics presents its own methodological problems, the basic
challenges facing researchers are not fundamentally different from
those faced by researchers in other fields. As economics develops, it
will broaden its repertory of methods and sources of evidence, the
science will become stronger, and the charlatans will be exposed.
Read more at http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/robert-j--shilleron-whether-he-is-a-scientist#LhU1x21U2rJJ3SSX.99